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Abstract:
In this paper I raise issues about the ways in which globalisation is taking shape in the
material world of economy, together with the changing rhetoric and repertoires of social and
cultural worlds, and where and how are men and women situated within these changing and yet
familiar worlds. I examine some current debates on the various levels of governance - the
national, the international and the local.  I suggest that a gendered analysis of the issues raised in
these debates is important to examine the new opportunities opened up by the processes of
globalisation, and those that are closed off  for both women and men. I conclude by examining
how gender mediates with social positioning, the trajectory of the struggles within/between
national sovereign states, the homogenising forces of marketisation, and the success, or
otherwise, of increasingly international social movements, and is  important part  of our
understanding of globalisation.
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1In this paper I examine the ways in which globalisation is taking shape in the material world of
economy,  together with the changing rhetoric and repertoires of social and cultural worlds,
and where and how are men and women situated within these changing and yet familiar
worlds. I argue that in the fragmentation of the national state order lie many pitfalls for women
and men, as do many new possibilities. Whether these possibilities open up new opportunities
or close off already existing options will be dependent on many factors such as the current
social positioning of women and men, the trajectory of the struggles within/between national
sovereign states, the homogenising forces of marketisation, and the success, or otherwise, of
increasingly global social movements.
Globalisation and Convergence of Policies
The International Context of Globality
The post-Cold War world is a place where the old alliances based on a clash of ideological and
political visions have been replaced by a monopoly of discursive power with the liberal west.
The dominance of the liberal discourse is most evident in the works that celebrate modernity
and look forward to the post-modern world as essentially liberal. The three dominant visions
of the world which have been extremely influential are those of Fukayama’s ‘end of history’
thesis(1991), Huntington’s vision of the victory of Christian liberal ethic over the Islamic in a
clash of civilisations (1995), and Barber’s lament against global capitalism and Islamic (and
other) fundamentalisms that undermine democracy, and an evocation of  a revitalised liberal
democracy within the national state structure (1996). In all these three sketches of the world in
the next century, liberal values triumph over others; aspects of western civilisation over other
cultures; modernity’s concerns are resolved through these triumphs. Struggles within the
parameters of other cultures, religions, and ideologies, upon this envisioning, are doomed to
failure unless they recognise the impossibility of reform from within. The logical conclusion
then is that western liberal world is the only future that we can ‘rationally’ look forward to if
we wish to live civilised, non-violent and democratic lives.
2For development studies this envisioning of liberal futures world wide has obvious importance.
In this context we see a new conditionality emerging in the development context - that based
on the liberal conceptualisation of ethics and human rights, with the individual at its heart. The
enthronement of possessive individualism then allows a consumerist ethic finding voice in the
foreign policies of the western countries (DFID,1998). Agency devolves to the western
consumer who becomes an actor in the global civil society and a participant in reconfiguring
recalcitrant, unaccountable national-states. On the other hand, the post-Cold War/Soviet
Union international context allows the international economic institutions to deploy
conditionality in the name of governance (see for example, World Bank, 1994) in order to
pursue the policies of liberalism through national bureaucracies, who are projected as
unaccountable if they refuse. In this conception of governance, non-governmental
organisations, especially the international NGOs play an important role in a space that is
supposedly being vacated by the nation-state.
Internationalisation or Globalisation?
There is a vast literature on globalisation that has been spawned in the last decade(). Higgott
and Reich, for example, define this concept in two ways:
“(i) as the emergence of a set of sequences and processes that are unhindered by territorial and
jurisdictional barriers and that indeed enhance the spread of trans-border practices in
economic, political, cultural and social domains, (ii) as a discourse of political knowledge
offering one view of how to make the post-modern world manageable.” (1997:5)
One of the questions asked repeatedly is whether there is anything new about globalisation, or
rather, why has globalisation become a conceptual category of such significance at the end of
the twentieth century. One argument for globalisation being a distinctive historical stage rests
on the challenge it poses to modernity. While the nation-state was firmly tied to modernity, the
argument goes, the promise of a global age is based upon the future of post-modernity:
“Fundamentally the Global Age involves the supplanting of modernity with globality and this
3means an overall change in the basis of action and social organization for individuals and social
groups.” (Albrow, 1996:4) There are, Albrow signals, at least five major ways in which
globality has taken us beyond the assumptions of modernity. They include the global
environment and consequences of aggregate human activities; the loss of security where
weaponry has global destructiveness; the globality of communication systems; the rise of a
global economy; and the reflexivity of globalism, where people and groups of all kinds refer to
the globe as the frame for their beliefs. ” (ibid.) Albrow concludes that taken “together these
represent the greatest challenge yet to the idea of even expanding modernity, and hence to the
nation-state.” (ibid.)
However there are those that point out that globalisation as a process that gave ‘a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country’, so that ‘in place of
the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction,
universal inter-dependence of nations’, was described by Marx and Engels a hundred and fifty
years ago in the Communist Manifesto. The internationalisation of capitalism was explanatory
of colonialism (Lenin) as well as of international socialism. Within the development literature
itself, the ‘trickle down’ and ‘comparative advantage’ conceptualisations of international
economic relations were presuming globality, as were the dependency theorists as critics (see
Chapter 2; Del Rosso Jr., 1995:175-207). International trade and competition too was clearly
highly developed by the 19th century, as were the international financial flows (Dunning,
1993, also see Hirst and Thompson, 1996). One could, of course, argue that technological
possibilities of bridging space and time (perhaps in Marxist speak, the means of production),
and the availability of these technologies have qualitatively transformed our understanding of
our place in the world. But an examination of the social and national profile of those who can
access these new technologies, as opposed to be accessed by them might tell us a very
different picture and a particular basis to globalisation. (some figures) However, what does
seem beyond dispute is that at the heart of globalisation lies the “Market, or at least ideologies
of free trade and open markets...[and] the increased potential for such flows [of international
market transactions], resulting from the reduction of elimination of national and local barriers
to all kinds of trade and investment.” (Picciotto, 1996:3)
4Embedded Global Markets
If markets are at the centre of the understanding of globality - through the mechanisms of
global production and exchange, of regulation that spans not one country but regions and
(with the increased role of international economic institutions, and the WTO) the globe,
through the use of technologies that so enhance the flows of monies and make instantaneous
financial transactions across the globe possible, through breaking down the political resistance
of nation-states to liberalisation and opening up of their internal markets to global competition
- then we need to analyse the impact of gendered roles for women within markets. This
analysis has to take place, we would argue, in the context of a theoretical understanding of
markets as embedded in wider social and cultural frameworks (Polanyi,1944) rather than as
rational, and impartial mechanisms for resource allocation as characterised by neo-liberal
economics. It also needs to signal the changing form of the labour markets world wide.
Perhaps one of the novelties of the globalised markets of the late twentieth centuries is the
very much increased possibilities of finance to flow across the world, while the earlier flow of
human labour across national frontiers is being systematically slowed down1. In this context
gender relations are being affected within the local spaces, and gender is affecting the mobility
of labour at the global level (see chapter on migration? fair trade?). The new development
discourse with the individual market agent central to it, also requires us to take seriously the
ways in which men and women are able to access, and play the market in order to enhance
their life-chances, or standards of living.
In discussing four dimensions of market power, White comments: “substance of market
politics is characteristically about a number of issues: about the position of an agent or agents
in relations to others within a market and their differential ability to extract resources through
exchanges with other market participants; about the rules of the game and the nature of
market institutions; and about the boundaries of the market.” (1993:5) The participants in the
market include the state, market organisations such as formal associations such as trade
unions, consumer groups, business associations, market networks, firms and individuals. The
functioning of the market depends upon the politics of state involvement, the politics of
                                                 
1 We thank  Prof. Sol Picciotto for formulating this proposition so succinctly.
5market structures and the politics of social embeddedness - of the state and the market (White,
1993: 6-10). In such a patterned market system, participants come to specific markets with
unequal capabilities and bargaining capacities and resources, which results in widely different
market structures, regulated by different state formations, and characterised by more or less
unequal power - class and gender are two bases for unequal power relations operating in the
market. Bhaduri comments that the market mechanism is “better understood not in terms of its
allocative efficiency, but as the mechanism for extraction of surplus by one class from another”
which he terms as the ‘class efficiency’ of markets (in White,:8). Evans argues that “the power
to threaten or disrupt economic relationships beyond the parameters of principal-agent
relations is the kind of extra-economic coercion or influence that the neo-classical model fails
to make explicit.” (Evans, 1993:25) It thus fails to take into account the embedded nature of
the markets. It does not query that individuals can pursue their economic self-interests in ways
that has nothing to do with the ‘best price’. Neither do they question the “degree to which
self-interest places economic goals ahead of friendship, family ties, spiritual considerations, or
morality.” (Block, 1990:54) Finally, there is an assumption that instrumentality in decision
making goes hand in hand with obedience to rules, and with maximising interests, rather than a
set of signals that can lead to conflictual economic and social behaviour in different groups of
populations. The social embeddedness of markets is therefore not considered, other than as a
distortion, by neo-classical economists.
For men and women, the  socially embedded market operates differently. For example, the
caste regime in India means the exclusion of women (and other deprived groups) from certain
areas of work (Bardhan, 1983); the colonial state in Africa ‘rationalised’ the production and
sale of alcohol by erasing women from the market (Parpart and Staudt, 1989). Much work has
also been done on the ways in which employers - state and non-state - use culturally based
norms to justify the restriction of  women’s employment to certain (low-paid) sectors (Mies;
Ong, 1987; Truong, 1990; Hart,1991). Structural adjustment and the privatisation of
important sectors of state activity has also resulted in the casualisation and feminisation of
certain labour sectors, resulting in tensions within the family for women as gender relations get
reconfigured. Of course, the market allows access to different women differently. Race and
class intersect to provide different opportunities to women from upper and lower classes
within the matrix of the market. White professional women inhabiting the world of
6international finance or involved in international bureaucratic machineries are positioned very
differently to white Russian women looking to improve their life chances by consenting to
become ‘catalogue brides’, and still more differently from Phillipina domestic workers in
Canada. However there is also evidence to show that gender cuts across race and class and is
one of the crucial factors in ways that markets allocate resources and jobs (see Rai, 1991
chapter 6; 1992.; Einhorn, 1992; and Gilmartin, et.al., 1994).
In an interesting critique of research on informal markets  MacEwan Scott concludes that the
gender segregation in the informal labour markets could be traced to the functioning of the
family: “the family, not as an institution that differentiated the supply of male and female
labour to the market, but as one that affected the entire organisation of small-scale production;
which handled resource allocation in a much wider sense and designated certain activities
[skilled, in the public sphere] appropriate for men and other activities  as appropriate for
women.” (1995: 125). Markets pose another issue for men and women. Globally, women own
about one per cent of world’s property; therefore they are involved in the globalisation process
through their access to labour markets than through their participation in financial or
production markets. They are provider of services - sexual, domestic and increasingly as
workers in export production - and are employed in lower paid work; they are not in control
of the huge financial and export flows in a globalised economy. Their specific positioning in
the market, and the feminist  and socialist critiques of markets pose questions about the nature
and functioning of markets, the values and behaviours that they generate and the controls and
mechanisms of accountability that are requeired in order that, in Polanyi’s terms, the
‘disruptive strains’ and ‘varied symptoms of disequilibrium’ (unemployment, class inequalities)
and ‘pressures on exchanges’ and ‘imperialist rivalries’ do not go unchallenged.
Converging Masculinities in a Global World?
Behavioural aspects of the market are particularly important to the language of neo-liberal
discourses on globalisation in normalising gendered patterns in the market place. For feminists
articles such as ‘In praise of the Davos Man’ (The Economist, 2.1.1997) pose crucial
questions about the role that women are expected to play in the expanding markets and on
7what terms, and point to the need to challenge not only the structural but the narrative power
of neo-liberalism.
The Davos man according to the Economist includes the new male actors of the globalised
economy: those “who hold university degress, work with words and numbers, speak some
English and share beliefs in individualism, market economics and democracy. They control
many of the world’s governments, and the bulk of its economic and military capabilities.” It is,
upon this view of new global masculinity, “the beauty of Davos Man that, by and large, he
does not give a fig for culture as the Huntingtons of the of the world define it.” (p.18) As
such, this figure symbolises the subordination of society to the economic system. Ling makes
the point that this hypermasculine man is also presented essentially as a ‘western rational man’.
(Ling, 1997:1).
Ling, however, contests this view by evoking the concept of hypermasculinity (characterised
by the Davos Man), first developed by Ashis Nandy in his study of colonialism as the
glorification of  aggression, competition, accumulation, and power, to explain the
developmentalism of the East Asian states. She suggests that in these states the nationalist
elites replay the relationship of hypermasculinity’s dominance over a feminised society through
enmeshing it in public patriarchy, and political authoritarianism. “Women in the [East Asian
societies] as the most feminized or feminized subjects, suffer the most extensive exploitation
and silencing.” (Ling, 1997:10) Ling argues that “globalisation serves as a venue for the
mutual reconstruction of  both global and local forces, precisely becuase identity is open,
organic, and unpredictable”; that it allows for “the convergence of global and local patriarchies
that underpin East Asia’s oft-cited ‘economic miracle’.” In terms of feminist politics, Ling
asserts, the analysis of global and local convergence of masculinities means avoiding a
flattening of the Third World woman’s identity takes place ‘under western eyes’ (Mohanty,
199?) by pointing to the participation of the national elites of East Asian countries in the
privileging of masculinist regimes of discursive and political power. In terms of the debate on
globalisation, the convergence of patriarchal control is best studied, as Ling points out,
“across cultural, spatial, and systemic divides.” (p. 9) And globally controlled and owned
media plays a significant part in this construction, and legitimation of a masculinised
8consensus. The representations of femininity find clear reflection in the recruitment of female
labour into the labour markets, the differential wage systems, the denial of property rights,
and, through structural adjustment inspired cutbacks in public provision, the increased burden
of women’s work within the family.
The concept of hypermasculinity makes a contribution towards opening up the debate on
gendered regimes of market access, as well as market operations. A hypermasculinised market
place is a hostile space for women to function within, especially as women re l rgely having
to enter the marketplace within the framework of survival or marginal improvement in their
quality of life rather than to make profit. However, while the concept allows us to examine the
historical significance of gendered identities of political and economic configurations, it once
again seems to set up binaries - though historically shifting - of male/female, state/society. The
feminine/feminized is characterised as powerless; women and the feminized without agency,
constructed and unchallenging within the discursive and structural framework of
developmental capitalism. It ignores the fact that  women’s access to markets can be crucial to
their survival, given the other structural constraints that they are functioning under. Thus,
struggles over the withdrawal of child care and health provisions under the regimes of
structural adjustment are also struggles for continued presence of women in the market place;
their earnings in the market are an important contribution to not only their individual but the
family’s survival.The feminisation of casualised labour markets, while undermining of
organised labour struggles, have allowed women the space for earning wages that are crucial
to the survival of their families. Further, the new forms of labour relations have led to
explorations of new types of labour organisations, such as SEWA (Self-Employed Women’s
Associations), and has also forced a recognition of the importance of this feminised labour
force on the agendas of the trade union movements.
The Disempowered State in the Global Age
With the focus on globalisation of the world economy, the national state too has come under
scruitiny. There is a growing l terature which assumes that globalisation and the
marginalisation of the national state go hand in hand. The argument has been most cogently
9put by Susan Strange(1995: 55-74). She makes three points to put her case: first that the
nature of competion between states in the international system has changed - from competing
over territory to competing over markets. Second, that as the form of competition between
states has changed, so have their nature, with trade and finance policies becoming more
important than defence and foreign policies. Finally, Strange argues that “authority over
society and economy is undergoing another period of diffusion, after two or three centuries in
which it became increasingly centralized in the in the institution of the state.” (p.55). Strange’s
analysis has been challenged. As Cable argues, “The nation-state has ‘lost’ sovereignity to
regional and global institutions and to markets but has also acquired new areas of control in
order to promote ‘national competitiveness’. (1995:23-24)
One of the most innovative analysis of the national state in the era of globalisation is that of
Robert Cox who argues that what we are witnessing is not the demise of the nation-state but
its ‘internationalisation’; not its destruction but its transformation. In brief, Cox argues that
from being bulwarks against the global intrusions into national economies, today’s states are
becoming mediators, adaptors and negotiators with the global political economy. To perform
this changed role they have to reconfigure the power structures of government, giving far
more emphasis to the role of finance and trade in economic regulation rather than industry and
labour, for example. The state’s role, therefore, becomes one of helping to adjust the domestic
economy to the requirements of the world economy (1996). In a sympathetic critique of this
position, Burnham points out that Cox’s analysis “underplays the extent to which
‘globalisation’ may be authored by states and regarded by state agents (both liberal market and
social democrat) as one of the most efficient means of restructuring labour/capital relations to
manage crisis in capitalist society.” (1998:p.5) In this context the nostalgia for a benign, or at
the very least powerless, nation-state is clearly misplaced. Burnham, following Polanyi, argues,
instead, that “National states exist as political ‘nodes’ or ‘moments’ in the global flow of
capital and their development is therefore part of the antagonistic and crisis-ridden
development of capitalist society. Recent changes in the [global political economy] are thus
predominantly about reorganising (rather than by-passing) states and this recomposition is
undertaken actively by state managers as part of a broader attempt to restructure, and respond
to, a crisis of labour/capital relations...” (p.8) If the state is a participant in the reconstitutions
of its own relations with the global political economy, then it continues to be a focus for the
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struggles against this changing relations - whether it is from (dis-)organised labour in the
urban or the rural context, whether it is from other social movements.
This more layered reading of the role that the state plays in national development allows for
further explorations of the state as embedded in different cultural contexts. If we take the state
to be an economic participant through its direct and indirect interventions in the sphere of
economy, then Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness becom  useful to analyse not only the
market but also the state. In this context of embeddedness an examination of how different
state fractions relate differently to each other, and to other civil and economic groups in
different cultural milieus becomes important. We would argue that ‘embeddedness’ of state
institututions in the power relations imbuing society, while supporting the goal of economic
development, can and does also act against the interests of the politically marginalised
groups.(Rai, 1996:14) This is because the relationship between a modernising state and a civil
society within which it is configured, is a complex one. While for some groups the mutual
reinforcing of bureaucratic capacity and social connectedness becomes the key to the
effectiveness of the developmental state’s effectiveness (Charlton and Donald, 1992, p.7), for
others, including women, the reinforcing of bureaucratic capacity by social norms can be a
terrifying combination. In this context to view the state as a unitary entity becomes paralysing,
and regarding civil society as ‘a space of uncoerced human association’ perilous  (Rai, 1996,
p. 17-18).
Embeddedness also raises another issue for the analysis of the nation state in the context of
globalisation. If the human economy is embedded in the non-economic (social) institutions as
well as the economic, then an understanding of the complexities of these institutions is needed
to assess their limits and potential. The nation-state as the focus of developmental struggles
allows historical knowledges of traditions, cultures, and political contexts to be mobilised with
greater fecility than the amorphous ‘international economic institutions’ peopled by shadowy
figures not visible to the local oppositional struggles. The frustrations of local struggles when
they are unable to hold the international elites accountable for the disasters brought upon
them, also fuels the lament for the nation-state.
11
The debate about the nature of the nation-state in the context of globalisation has not only
focused attention on the protean nature of power relations, but has provoked another, more
sentimental, intellectual response. There is a growing literature on the nation-state in the
‘nostalgic mode’ which obscures as much as it reveals in its analysis of the national/global
dichotomy of power relations. For women this debate is relevant because it uses some of the
iconography of nationalisms and also poses difficult questions about feasible politics.
Nostalgic Critics of Globalisation
As the nation-state is being represented as an endangered species, we also see a growing
nostalgia for it. In the post-war period the nation-state became both the embodiment of
national aspirations for development and the site of social engagement. While the state was
configured differently in various countries of the Third World, the role of the state in
development was seen to be central in all contexts. The failure of the state to deliver on its
promises might lead to political instability, international interventions, or social unrest, but the
focus of all was the nation-state. The Cold War politics provided a curious stability which
meant that the role of non-governmental organisations was minimal and regulated and
generally confined to immediate relief needs in times of crises. The multi-national corporations
operated with impunity in some Third World states, but in others with much more caution, and
within much less space. The ‘spheres of influence’ of the superpowers dictated some
curtailment of state power, but also limited the challenges to it within its boundaries. It is with
this context in mind that we must read the nostalgia that is building up for the nation-state as
the rhetoric of globalisation gathers momentum.
In a recent article Kothari points out with concern that there is “evidence of growing
marginalisation of the state in the face of a variety of globalising intrusions- in fact a growing
disempowerment of the state and of the national elite both in its power to enforce national
priorities ...” He  arraigns the protagonists of globalisation for “converging on the need to
reduce the role of the state in the affairs of the country and hand over things to market
mechanisms and to increase integration into the ‘world market’” For them, he laments,
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“pressures and demands from within, emanating from one’s own people, are more dangerous
than the pressures and demands coming from foreign corporations...” For a long time, he
reminds us, “the nation-building exercise was conceived to be one that simultaneously led to
greater unity of the nation and greater involvement and participation for the citizen in the
institutions of the state.” But now “the retreat of the state and the erosion of the nation are
going hand in hand, one being hijacked by the global ‘order’ and ‘market’ and the other facing
serious challenges from within..” He warns that as the nation-state becomes more and more
unable to cope, the national elite “turn away from the basic political challenge of nation-
building and the related economic challenge of ‘development’”.  He  prophesises “[a]s this
happens, the autonomy of civil society too will decline and with it may also go down the
modern search for a democratic order.”  (1995, pp.1593-1603) In The Revolt of the Elites and
Betrayal of Democracy (1995), Christopher Lasch makes a similar point about the
deminishing nation-state and its consequences for  d mocracy. Lasch argues that the
“denationalisation of business enterprise tends to produce a class of cosmopolitans who set
themselves as ‘world citizens, but without accepting...any of the obligations that citizenship in
a polity implies...”(p.47) Lasch bemoans the global decline of the middle class that has
accompanied the diminishing of the nation-state: “Whatever its faults, middle-class nationalism
provided a common ground, common standards, a common form of reference” and warns that
without such a bedrock of stability “society dissolves into nothing more than contending
factions, as the Founding Fathers of America understood so well - a war of all against all.”
(p.49)
A close reading of the literature in the nostalgic mode raises interesting questions. One could
argue that this nostalgia for the nation-state also reflects the growing fear of male dominated
national-elites of powerlessness which they had only just recently escaped through the
processes of decolonisation. In Chapter 1 we explored the ways in which the colonial
discourses ‘emasculated’ the traditional nationalist elites; the process of regaining their
masculinity had involved confrontation with colonial power, and with creating an alternative
hegemonic discourse that feminised the ‘other’ within the nation. This process had led to a
nationalising of patriarchy: “Whereas the traditional exercise of patriarchal authority tended to
rest with particular men - fathers, husbads and other male kin - the communalization of
politics, particularly when backed by state sponsored religious fundamentalism, shifts the right
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of control to all men” argues Kandiyoti (1991, p. 14). In the context of this public patriarchy,
national bureaucracies  of the nation-state regained their masculinity by setting themselves up
as the opposition to the traditional forms of patriarchy; of creating within the dominant
discourses largely based on equality, spaces for women’s emancipation from the ‘pre-modern’
conditions of the colonial society. Control over national development agendas enhanced the
sense of power flowing back to the indigenous male elites, invoking the images of rational
protectors, and planners for future national development. These agendas remained tied to the
ideas of modernisation, mechanisation and industrialisation - arenas where women’s presence
was minimally visible. As ecofeminists like Shiva have pointed out the discursive framework of
science and rationality employed by these modernising elites also contributed to the
marginalisation of women from the processes of development.  This reconfigured sense of self
of the national bureaucracies is under attack by the disempowerment spelled by the operations
of the market on the global scale. In assessing gender relations within Malaysia’s Muda region,
Hart comments: “not  only are men incorporated into political patronage relations, which
women are largely excluded: in addition, they are confronted with a principle that defines them
as superior and responsible for women, simultaneously with an incapacity to put this principle
into material practice in the domestic sphere.” (1991:115) The national patriarchies  find
themselves in similar positions vis a vis global economic forces and their domestic populations.
However, such a reading is only a partial explanation of the changing face of the national state.
The nostalgic recollection of the glory days of the nation-state is also disingenuous. The
disempowered state is presented as a hapless victim of global market forces, as if it is not
implicated in any way - through mismanagement, greed, incompetence, and policy changes - in
the ‘opening up’ of its markets to the global forces. Further, the defenders of the nation-state
paint a picture of the nation-state and its elites as largely benign, struggling under historical
burdens of racial, communal, and religious hatred, trying to bring order to disordered
societies, enlightenment to bear upon traditional prejudices that had not until then allowed a
sense of national purpose: “The relationship of the new nation to pre-existing identities was in
part to be one of transcendence, though it was far more to be one of encompassing them them
and in some ways even ‘representing’ them all in a composite manner” (Kothari, 1995, p.
1594). The costs of building of composite national entities and identities were, however,
borne in large part by the marginalised, subaltern, non-hegemonic groups of which women
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were a significant part. Also, this benign picture of the transformative nationalist elites is based
upon a very narrow base. There are a few countries like India, Tanzania, and Egypt that
experienced sustained periods of political stability and where the nationalist state e joyed  any
significant legitimacy. In these countries, the state elites did seek to change the existing power
relationships. However, even in these democratic states, levels of social inequality and
economic poverty remained significant. In many other states, as the dependency theorists
pointed out, the economy remained dependent upon the global capitalist market forces, and
the state elites remained cut off from the needs and aspirations of their citizens. The current
enthusiasm of many national elites for adjusting to the demands of global economic institutions
shows how implicated the national states are in the whole process of marketisation and
globalisation.
For feminists, the nation-state has always presented serious intellectual and strategic
challenges. On the one hand, any engagement with the state has been questioned on the
grounds that “the state...produces state subjects inter alia, bureaucratized, dependent,
disciplined and gendered...”  (Brown, 1992, p. 9; also see Alan in Watson). There has been an
ongoing debate within the feminist movement about the expropriatory power of institutions
(see Brown, 1992, Rai, 1995, Pringle and Watson, 1992, Ehrenreich and Piven, 1982). The
various positions have covered the entire spectrum from rejecting 'dealing' with state
institutions entirely, to suggesting a 'in and against' the state approach, to examining the
benefits of working with/through state institutions. It has been argued elsewhere that for
women the state and civil society are both complex terrains - fractured, oppressive,
threatening and also providing spaces for struggles and negotiations. These struggles and
negotiations are grounded in the positionings of various groups of women articulating their
short and long term interests in the context of the multiplicity of power relations that form the
state in any country. In tur , the state and its institutions are also ‘shaped’ by the forms and
outcomes of these struggles. While denying any intentionality to the state, or a necessary
coherence to the alliances formed and engaged in struggles against states, there are, however,
particular characteristics of Third World states that need to be examined to form a judgement
about the various possible spaces for mobilisation by women in their interests. In  Ind a, for
example, state institutions and dominant political parties have taken up the cause of women’s
representation as part of the generalised discourse of modernity to which they subscribe. This
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discourse, while not unified in itself, allows sections of the state to take initiatives to respond
to the struggles of women for equality as well as empowerment. This results in intra-state
conflict which allows further possibilities of negotiations and struggles by and in the interests
of women’s interests. Further, the capacity of the state to implement its policies and enforce
its laws is undermined by the weakness of the economy and of the political infrastructure, and
widespread corruption which leads to the de-legitimisation of government and the political
system. This lack of capacity further enhances intra-state conflict (Rai, 1995).
However, state institutions cannot be the sole focus of these struggles. Civil society while
providing a space for mobilisation also constrains the construction and organisation of
interests that challenge the dominant discourses of gendered power. In this context, the
relationship between the state and civil society becomes an important arena for negotiations
and struggles. Where state institutions are deeply ‘embedded’ in civil society  and its ‘peak
interest groups’, state institutions are constrained not to propose policies that would be
opposed by these peak interest groups. However, the modernist project that they ascribes to,
especially when operating representative democratic politic systems, mean they cannot be
entirely neglectful of issues arising for women’s struggles, and forces them to take issue with
some of the dominant interest groups. The result is a policy framework and its implementation
that are at best patchy, allowing for another set of possibilities for struggles around expanding
the domain of reform as well as improving the capacity of effectively implement existing
policies (Rai, 1995a). The nation state in its fractured and fractioned form thus remains an
important focus for struggle for women. The national elites remain implicated in the changes
to economic and social policies affecting women’s lives, and the implementation of these
policies brings women’s groups into conflict and negotiations with state agencies. In tracing a
path through the new spaces and old of work, welfare, and family resentments of national
elites as well as pressures of global institutions become useful political tools.
The question of struggle has often raised the issue of the locale of struggle. Where are women
most able to participate in struggles to improve their lives? Participation, a key concept in
feminist politics, has been assumed to be most effective at the local level. So much so, that in
some countries local participation has been sought to be institutionalised through legislation
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on the premise that development policy outcomes are sub-optimal when not supported by
broad based participation from the social groups targetted by the policy (Robinson, 1998,
forthcoming). In Bolivia, for example, a Law of Popular Participation became effective in
1994, and in India, under the 73rd and 74th Amendments the village level governance
instituitons (panchayats) were given greater powers and resources, and women were given a
quota of 33 per cent on these re-invegorated instituions. In the debates on political
participation of women, for example, the first agencies held up for scruitiny are at the village
level. There has been an attempt to challenge the public/private divide in politics by presenting
women’s work supporting male members engaged in politics within the home as ‘political’
(Thapar,1993). In the context of globalisation, the emphasis on NGO activity has also brought
this political space into focus; the most effective NGOs work at the local levels.The nation-
state seems at times to be replaced by the expansion of the local in political discourse. In the
following section we examine this concept of the local - not as a missing link between the
nation-state and global governance, but as a problematic terrain which women have to
function on, and which affects the ways in which they are able to access the local economy and
beyond. It is important to do this in order to see how the debates on post-development, and
the changing/contracting role of the state are affecting the lives of men and women.
The Local as Refuge?
If women’s work challenges the divisions between the public and the private, their lives also
raise questions about the importance of the local spaces that they occupy. The ‘local’ has
found privileged place in the vocabulary of different groups concerned with issues of
development and democracy - basic needs theorists, environmentalists, sustainablity groups,
feminists, and those intervening in the human rights debate. This has been for several reasons.
First, the emphasis on the local allowed a critique of nationalist agendas of political elites
focused on big projects of industrialisation. As Pearson has commented, these projects
assumed the man as worker, and in countries such as Brazil and India, we see industrialisation
resulting in the falling levels of women’s employment in the public sphere. Second, a focus on
the local challenges the universalism of  cientific discourses upon which the framework of
modernisation was built by pointing to the salience of local knowledges and paradigms: “It is
local knowledge that informs the birthing skills of the sages-femmes.....And it is local
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knowledge produced by workers that is the object of appropriation and control in both
Taylorist and ‘postindustrial’ strategies of industrial management” (Kloppenburg, Jr., 1991,
p.14; see also, Berry, 1991; Esteva and Prakash, 1997). The idea of the local is sensitive to the
context of peoples lives. “Related to the theme of context or locale is the idea of distance
which also has social, emotional or geographical dimensions....betwee  authors and
subject...[between] First Nation or Diaspora women” (Marchand and Parpart, 1995:77).
Third, a focus on the local allows people to participate in the economic and political life of
their communitiy “Thousands of small grassroots groups are realizing that there is no need to
‘think big’ in order to begin releasing themselves from the clutches of the
monopolistic...economy;  that they can free themselves in the same voluntary ways as they
entered it” (Esteva and Prakash, 1997:280;) Fourth, a focus on the local also challenges
authoritarianism by promoting decentralisation and autonomy. The local, upon this view, is
democratic, inclusive, and the site for feasible politics of resistance to both global and national
nodes of power.
The recent emphasis on the ‘grassroots’ in the development funding agencies and their
agendas is proof of the importance now being attached to the concept. NGOs as part of civil
society organisation also find favour within this discourse. The argument there is that the local
is not only closer to the lives of people, it is also allows for greater sensitivity to local ecology,
it is more accountable, and more participatory (World Bank’s report on Governance, 1994).
Finally, a focus on the local also challenges possessive individualism of the liberal rights
discource by arguing that the universal language of rights cannot capture the complexities of
historically rooted cultural practices that empower people at the local level in their
communities: “In most Latin American, Asian or African villages, collective or communal
rights have clear priority over personal or individual rights; legitimate hierarchies (of the
elders, for example) have primacy over equality ...; and concrete customs, rather than abstract
universalizable laws, support communal bonds and organize social support.” (Esteva and
Prakash, 1997:282; see also Sachs, 1997: 290).
The focus on the local has been a powerful challenge to many of the fundamental reference
points of development theory and practice. By advocating a decentralisation of power it has
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tried to make nation-states more accountable, people’s and women’s participation more
feasible, the contexts of peoples’ lives more visible, and the universalisms of science less
monolithic. However, we need to sound a cautionary note here. This caution is dictated by
various concerns. The first is that the privileging of the local space is very often linked to
issues of capacity of the national state. It is interesting that the World Bank and the IMF are
emphasising the local space at the same time as the conditionalities they are imposing upon the
national state are increasing. The forcing open of national market boundaries is resulting in the
reconfiguration of demographic and geographic spaces within countries. This opening up has
led in many Third World countries to experience huge migratory flows of populations for the
first time. These flows have been inevitably from the countryside to the urban centres. With
the establishment of Free Economic Zones, these flows have also seen the huge increase of
women migrants. The local space in the countryside has changed enormously, as has the urban
landscape. The concept of the local in this context is itself being stretched. What is the locale
for the migrant woman? Her home that she has left behind, or her present, which is not home?
This displacement is also resulting in increased vulnerabilities for women. Sexual violence, as
well as economic exploitation re increasing in many liberalising countries. This is happening
in tandem with the wittling away of state-based support infrastructure - hospitals, schools,
refuges, and other social services are being closed, cut down, or privatised. In this context the
question of decentralisation becomes a difficult one. While economic policies are being crafted
in international arenas, the consequences are being felt and lived at the local level. The role of
the nation-state becomes vital in this context - at times it is complicit in the ‘glocalisation’ of
society  (Robertson, 1992), at others a mediator between the local and the global. A shift of
focus away from the nation-state means a neglect of the crucial mapping of the nation-state’s
role and influence, and therefore of a judicious response to it.
Second, our caution stems from the discourse of the local itself. Writing about the local in
another context, Marx had talked about the ‘ideocy of village life’. We have already
commented upon the positivism, and universalism of Marxism. However, we would suggest,
in parallel with Marx, that for women the village of many Third World countries, is not a
space of freedom or security. Indeed, that the levels of culturally validated oppressions,
exclusions, violation and surveillance that women experience in the villages are extremely
high. Marxist materialists have argued that urbanisation resulting from industrialisation will
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result in breaking down of the ascriptive roles in society, which affect women in particularly
restrictive ways (Desai, ). We would argue that urbanisation, while presenting their own
problems and struggles, does afford women a relative freedom of action often denied them in
the locales of their villages. We would suggest that the discource about  empowerment
through localisation could also be seen to be a Westernised discourse, where the local and
urban have gone hand since the advent of Second Wave feminism. 2 Wh n this discourse is
transposed to the rural local of the majority of the Third World women, different cultural
contexts make the valorisation of the concept more problematic. This is not to take away from
the importance of the local in the lives of women, but to query the privileging of it as a freer,
less distant, more empowering space. It is with such querying  that we can put the politics in
the local back in, rather than treating it as a homogeneous, cooperative and democratic space.3
The local is as fractured a space as the national or the global. It has its own power hierarchy in
operation, with the resources to defend existing relations of power, and to suppress dissent. It
is also therefore the space where democratic struggles need to be organised; it is not in itself a
means of democratising life.
A growing literature on empowerment points to local spaces as arenas of participatory
politics. However, within development discourse and practice, participation, as well as the
local, have been depoliticised; participation as well as the ‘decentralised space’ has become the
panacea for accountable development. As methodology, Robert Chambers’ Participatory
Rural Appraisal (PRA) technique is particularly popular with development agecies. The
starting point of this methodology is also a dis atisfaction with the top-down approach of
state-led development. “This approach is highly critical of Western experts, emphaisezes the
need for less top-down approaches to development and assues the knowledge and analytical
skills of the poor, no matter their education, can be brought ot light and strengthened through
participatory methods which will lead to true empowerment and development.” (Parpart,
1999, 260; Chambers, 1994b) Experiential innovation rather than theoretical abstractions are
emphasised in this approach. Inclusiveness of the least privileged is one of its pillars. In a
gendered critique of this methodology Parpart points to the deeply embeded patriarchal norms
that the PRA practitioners cary with them, and emphasises that “[p]ow r structures exist at the
                                                 
2 We are grateful to Prof. Catherine Hoskyns for bringing this point to our attention.
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local level as well” (p. 264; see also Kabeer, 1995 and Tiessen, 1997) and that “[c]ontrol over
knowledge is often an essential element of local power structures, thus not something local
elites are willing to discuss.” (p.265) The giving voice to the marginalised as part of the PRA
programme might be both disempowering and threatening for different groups and individuals,
especially for women. Gender specific training is not generally part of the PRA programmes
and formalised skill-share programmes are often not suited to women’s work
patterns.(pp.266-267). Finally, an understanding of strucutural power is absent from this
methodology, as are the identity based politics that so influence the choices that men and
women make, as well the options that they feel that are open to them (pp. 269-271). As such,
“Particiaption as project methodology [can become for states and international institutions],
the most tractable of the NGO approaches to participation...When couched in the language of
economic effectiveness, rather than in that of political values, the participation agenda
permits... [global economic institutions such as the World] Bank to align itself with
proponents of participation, and to involve NGOs in implementing projects that many
governments increasingly cannot manage.” (Nelson, 1996:624).
I would argue that such a leaking out of politics from concepts serves only to maintain the
status quo through instrumental confusion between ends and means. NGO activity has
proliferated in recent years. It has been seen as indicative of the incapacity of nation-states on
the one hand, and the privatisation of social welfare on the other (Arellano-Lopez and Petras,
1994; Craske, 1998). While the unaccountability of states is targetted that of the NGO sector
is largely ignored. Kabeer has suggested that even when NGOs promote gender-senstivity
within their programmes, the often fail to have much impact on local institutional structures
(1995). The work of the NGOs, while extremely important in immediate terms of structural
adjustment, is also instrumental in depoliticisation of popular protest (Craske, 1998). The
bridging of the global-local divide by international NGOs brings forth its own issues. As Goetz
has argued, state funded and managed local organisations are sometimes more sensitive to
local customs and social relations and therefore better able to move gender agendas forward,
than the INGOs who are seen as alien to the local milieu (1996). The local thus presents as
many challenges to women in negotiating their gender positio  as does the national and the
                                                                                                                                             
3 Such  unproblematized views of civil society also abound. See Fine and Rai, 1997, Preface.
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global. Making use of each spatial and political level requires complex negotiations in
furthering the advancement of women’s position.
Global Governance and GAD: New challenges for Development?
The above discussion of levels of governance and issues raised by the shifting boundaries of
the local, national and the international lead us to view the current debates on governance and
how they imbricate with the agendas of engendered development. There are several important
issues to be raised here. The first is that at the end of the twentieth century we find the
fundamental issues of governance and development relatively unchanged - security and the
enhancement of our life chances still preoccupy us most. Is this a failure of development
strategies pursued, or an indicator of the limitations of our imaginations? Second, at the end of
the twentieth century we find ourselves living in a world without ideological divide writ large
in international politics. There is a sense of lack of alternative to the liberal ideology, which
might be considered liberating for some and threatening for others. Third, we find ourselves
living in a world that is clearly seen to be one, and yet where the individual competitive ethic is
predominant. We can see this contradiction when we hear talk of sustainable development on
the one hand, and sustainable growth on the other; interdependence and free market go hand
in hand; technologist solutions predominate at the expense of redistributive ones. In this
new/old context how are the feminist development agendas shaping up? What are the demands
of the feminist movements regarding development?  In this final section I briefly sketch out the
dilemmas faced by feminist movements addressing issues of development in a global age.
Global Governance and a ‘new design for development cooperation’ .
Starting in 1990 the UN Development Programme has brought out annual Human
Development Reports that reflect a new approach to measuring development in the light of
debates on sustainable development, empowerment, and human capability in Development
Studies (Chapter 2). Development has been regarded as enabling people to make, enlarge and
have life choices. Considerable attention has been paid to disagregating development data for
both men and women. What is absent in these reports, however, is a serious consideration of
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how these choices are to be enlarged for both men and women, given the structural constraints
imposed but existing power relations in societies, and who is going to excercise them
(Nijeholt, 1992, pp. 15-16).
The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, for example, asserts that in the globalised
world, the “traditional North-South clevage is no longer a useful basis for negotiations.” Not
collective weakness of the South, but the individual country’s domestic economic strength
gives it its place in the international order. It concludes that “now is the time to move on from
the sterile confrontations of the past and to forge a new and productive economic partnership
among the nations of the world - not on charity but on mutual interest, not on confrontation
but on cooperation, not on protectionism but on an equitable sharing of market opportunities,
not on stubborn nationalism but on farsighted internationalism.”(UNDP; 1994:61) In the same
document we also see how fragile the basis of these hopes is. With the Japanese exception, the
countries ranked from 1-15 on the Human Development Index on key indicators such as life
expectancy, adult literacy, schooling, GDP per capita, and the HDI itself are all in the North,
and the lowest ranked countries all in the Third World (pp. 129-131). In terms of security,
military suppliers and buyers are also on different sides of the North-South divide (p.55). In
terms of  the distribution of economic activity the richest fifth made up exclusively of the
Northern countries garner 84.7 per cent of the world GNP, 84.2 per cent ofworld trade,  85.5
per cent of domestic savings, and 85.0 per cent of domestic investment. The figures for the
poorest fifth of the global economy have 1.4, 0.9, 0.7, and 0.9 on these indicators. Upon its
own figures, the Report shows global improvement, but growing intercountry disparity (p.96).
In this context, the discource of development cooperation can only be interpreted as another,
less constrained, view of the ‘trickle down’ theory - increased growth will eventually narrow
the gap between the rich and the poor (and men and women) if the global market is allowed to
operate without undue restrictions, and where comparative advantage is allowed to determine
the participatory levels of national economies in the international arena. This view
predominates the World Development Reports of the World Bank. The emphasis there is on
efficient labour-intensive growth as a development strategy for poor countries, a growth based
on market incentives, technological innovation, mechanisation, and extending of economic
infrastructure. While poverty alleviation is made focus of the 1990 Report, for example, what
we get is an “a-historical approach to today’s poverty, its neglect of the power relations
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leading to poverty and its top-down approach indealing with the poor perceiving them as
petients in need of social services and safety nets.” (a Nij holt, 1992:17) Women in this
context are treated as examples for the success and failures of various projects. Education, in
the traditional liberal formulation, is seen as the key to women’s development; however, even
here the emphasis is on the utility of education in affecting women’s traditional role of
reproduction as the most effective population control strategy. In sum, there is a depoliticising
of the development agenda in the name of a consensus in the post-Cold War world in favour
of a ‘market-friendly’ approach to development (World Development Report, 1991:1).
In parallel, in the report of the Commission on Global Governance, we see this development
discourse stretched to cover the governing institutions too (1995). The Report speaks the
language of ‘global values’, ‘common rights’, and addresses the role and potential of a
transformative politics of civil society organisations and the non-governmental organisations.
(1995: 56-57). Its view of security is broader than the security of individual state borders, and
encompasses people’s human rights, and the need for demilitarization as part of the security
agenda (pp71-74). It also point out that globalisation of the market is confined to the
movement of “capital (but not labor) flows...” but does not seek to make changes to the WTO
in the light of this observation. In his critique of the work of the Commission Baxi comments
on the discrepancy between the assumptions of globality by the Commission and the “central
facts of contemporary world disorder” (Alternatives, 21, 1996, pp525-549; p. 530). Violence
and poverty in particular are growing apace, and both affect women in particular ways. The
feminisation of poverty, and violence against women in creating and policing new and old
inter-state borders has made this co-operative development a fraught discourse for women. In
this context Baxi rightly comments that “If governance is to be conceived as a process, it is
well to recall that process is permeated by structures-in-dominance, both in states and civil
socieites.” (p. 532) The politics of co-operation as well as of confrontation and conflict needs
to be made visible here; the wishing away of confrontation is the confimation of existing
structures-in-dominance.
In terms of process of governance, the concept of global governance raises the issue of power
too: “Effectiveness signals two kinds of power: first, to ‘build upon and influence decisions
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taken locally, nationally and regionally’; second, to ‘draw on the skills and resources of a
diversity of people and institutions at many levels’” (p. 533). Who are the actors in global
governance is an important a question as wh  are not included in the process of governance.
At the level of institutional actors, states, corporations, economic and social institutions, and
civil society organisations and NGOs are all participants at different levels of governance. A
glance at the gender balance of all these institutions would reveal a highly masculinised
governance process and machineries. But gender is not the only axis of exclusion - class and
race are the other.
Feminist co-optations? The politics of mainstreaming?
In the 1990s the system of global institutional politics has come under scruitiny. On the one
hand, there is an attempt to provide the UN with an increased relevance - not as an organ of
supra-national global governance, but as an organisation representing collective action of
states in an ‘issue specific’ rather than generalised manner (Higgott, 1998:34). On the other
hand,  the UN is generally considered to be ineffective, bureaucratised and unrepresentative of
the rapidly changing world. The US has led the crusade for a refashioning of the UN
machinery, and a great deal of emphasis has been given to making the UN more accountable
to its members.  The UN for its part, has had to deal with newly emerging powerful competing
institutions of governace in the WTO, and has seen the earlier economic institutions - the
World Bank and the IMF - making increasing inroads into the social and political arenas.
‘Good governance’ is on the agenda of the economic institutions and is being made part of the
conditionality of aid. This has resulted in a demand by the donors upon the reciepient nations -
“for democratic pluralism, for the rule of law, for a less regulated economy and for a clean and
non-corrupt administration....f r greater decentralization...” (UNDP, 1994:76).
In this shifting pattern of governance debates and institutional initiatives, women have to
address the issue at different levels. The first is that of agenda setting, the second, at the level
of women’s activism and its focus, and the third at the level of institutional participation and
mainstreaming of gender politics and programmes of development. We would argue that a
disaggregation of these levels reveals a complex picture. First,  that there is a shift from
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addressing the problems of gendered development for women of the Third World to regarding
these problems as shared between North and South. This has been made possible because of
the dominance of neo-liberal economic policies in the western states themselves, as well as the
imposition of structural adjustment policies on the countries of the Third World. The
globalisation of economic policy dominance has allowed women of different countries to talk
across borders, and to increase their associational activities globally. However, for feminists
this poses a new dilemma. For years feminists have been struggling with the issue of
difference. Third World feminists have taken issue with Western feminisms assumptions of
commonality between the two. While neo-liberalism has faced women of the North and South
with some similar issues arising out of the withdrawal of state welfare, can we disregard the
wider historical and political contexts to view the effects of structural adjustment as common
to the two? Can  market-friendly development provide a new basis of ‘global sisterhood’?
Globalisation and structural adjustment have also increased the engagement of women’s civil
society associations with not only the national state, but with international organisations - the
UN, but also the World Bank. Some feminists have advocated such a “constructive
engagement and ‘entry’ into institutional processes and cognitive frameworks, rather than
employing more overtly political tactics of capturing the resources and undermining the public
image of such institutions...” ((Scholte, Goetz et.al., forthcoming 1998,pp.27-28). This could,
of course,  also mean providing legitimacy to the very organisations which are imposing
conditionalities of various kinds - including withdrawal of state welfare - on nation-states. It
again raises the issue of difference and how it plays out on the global feminist arena. At the
level of agenda setting,  the current activism of women’s CSOs, particularly in the North, is
thus focused on mainstreaming gender within international institutions. It al o means a
particular engagement with these economic institutions which could lead to a charge of co-
optive politics (Nelson, 1996); that together with other issue based social movements,
women’s movements are also focused simply on gainig access to already established structures
of power, rather than on challenging and if possible overthrowing these (Burnham, 1997).
While not agreeing with such a blanket rejection of the non-class based politics, we would
argue that in order to address the issue not simply of recognition of gender inequality but also
of redistribution of resources to overcome this inequlity, women’s activism has to invoke the
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politics of structural change as well as that of mainstreaming gender(Fraser, 1997; Young,
1997; Coole, 1997; Hoskyns and Rai, 1998).
Conclusion
In laying out the various levels of governance that women have to negotiage with and struggle
against, I have also sought to raise issues that these negoitiations and struggles pose for them.
Feminist movements as social movements have achieved a great deal in not only politicising
gender within the nation-state but also within the international system. That has been the
success of the women’s and feminist movements. At the cusp of the new millenium, it is
important to view this achievement with justifiable pride. When the World Bank begins to
view gender as an important issue, when ‘Women’s Eyes on the Bank’ make it uncomfortable
and wanting to engage in the gender debate, feminist movements can take heart and keep up
the pressure. When gender inequality becomes one important issue for assessing human
development then women’s social movements can be seen to have succeeded. However, the
above discussion also shows the importance of the context of international power relations, of
structural constraints that function within the local, national and international spaces to stymie
not only the expansion of opportunities for women but sometimes their very survival.
In discussing the character and role of social movements Scholte et.al. make several points:
that these are a subset of civil society; they seek far-reaching transformation of society; their
power lies in popular mobilisation  to influence the holders of economic and political power.
They differ from state elites in that they do not have at their disposal means of coercion
(legitimate or not); they differ from business interests as they do not command sufficient
capital to influence public policy through its movement; they can be distinguished from interest
groups in seeking large-scale social change - they are anti-systemic (p.9;). As such social
movements are also democratic (p.10). There is however, a more cautionary view that points
to the integrative function that social movements perform; they can be safety valves of
discontented popular movements (Scott, 1990, p.15). The middle class nature of women’s
movements’ leaderships for example led many women activists in the Third World to keep
distant from them. Feminism and feminists were labled as western and educated middle class
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women; an easy discourse for the local and state elites to use, but of no less concern to women
who wanted to be seen to belong to the culture they were challenging. Secondly, when we
examine the rhetoric of many social movements the critiques of the existing power relations
are not always matched by a view of power that would allow them to move towards
fundamentally redistributing resources. Increasingly, feminists are concerned that in
succeeding in the battle for recognition of gender inequalities, feminist social movement is
losing the struggle for redistribution of power relations (Fraser, 1997; Hoskyns and Rai,
1998). It has also been argued that the idea of global civil society of which social movements
are part is a “liberal recasting of world politics in a period of globalisation.” That v a the
agency of social movements within global civil society, “the liberal dream of expanding
freedom through voluntary association and the confidence in surmounting natural constrains
reappears.” (Kemal:1996:644) These concerns point to some difficult dilemmas for feminists
working in the area of development. Questions of difference, of elitism, of negotiations,
engagements and oppositions to state structures that had faced them in the 1970s and 1980s
have become more complex still in the context of globalisation. An closer analysis of the
economic fallout of globalisation in the shape of structural adjustment policies reveals how
contested and uneven is the global economic and polical space .
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